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ABSTRACT 
 
In the UK, Home Education, or home-schooling, is an issue that has attracted very little 
public, governmental or academic attention. Yet the number of children home educated is 
steadily increasing and has been referred to as a 'quiet revolution'. This article neither 
celebrates nor denigrates home educators, its aim, rather, is to identify and critically 
examine the two dominant discourses that define the way in which the issue is currently 
understood. First, the legal discourse of parental rights, which forms the basis of the 
legal framework, and secondly a psychoanalytical/common-sense 'socialisation' 
discourse within which school attendance is perceived as necessary for healthy child 
development. Drawing on historical, doctrinal human rights and psychoanalytical 
sources and post-structural and feminist perspectives, this article suggests that both 
discourses function as alternative methods of governance and that the conflicting ‘rights 
claims’ of parents and children obscure public interests and fundamental questions 
about the purpose of education.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
“When I was seven, a big thing happened. A lady came to talk to my mother from 
the town school, wanting to know when I was going to enrol in the first grade. 
The law on this wasn’t clear, but it was the normal thing to do.”1
 
[add: not a description of the law . . nor a discussion of the arguments for and against 
home education . . .] 
 
In the UK home education, or home schooling,2 is an obscure issue that has attracted 
very little academic, government or public attention3. There are no national statistics 
recording the number of children home educated and the legal framework, and the central 
role of local education authorities (LEAs) within it, has remained effectively unchanged 
for over 130 years. Moreover, while a child's right to education4 and, although to a lesser 
                                                           
1 Eva Hoffman, The Secret (Secker and Warburg, 2001), p 17. 
2 Home education in the context of this article refers solely to situations where children of school age 
are educated at home because the parents choose, for whatever reason, have chosen not to send them to 
school. It should not therefore be confused with home tuition, which refers to education within the 
home provided by local education authorities.   
3 Education law texts no reference (Ruff?) or two lines . Harris, Bainham - incorrectly suggest that the 
introduction of the National Curriculum has made it harder. Petrie only one plus Childright . . . – very 
in favour; law texts one sentence, a footnote Governemmt guidance ; Halsbury’s Law 
4 See for example S.Hart, C.Cohen, M.Erickson and M. Flekkoy (eds) Children’s Rights in Education 
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extent, the compulsory nature of education and the absence of children's rights within 
schools5 have been the focus of much concern, the existence or legitimacy of a child's 
right to attend school, as distinct from a right to education, has largely been overlooked6. 
In a context of increased concern about educational standards, growing recognition of 
'children's rights', 30 years of almost continual and radical education legislation (with an 
extensive diminishing of LEA powers7) and more broadly at a time when childhood, the 
home and education are perceived as key sites of governance for the future well being of 
society,8 the ‘silence’ about this issue is perhaps surprising. To a certain extent it can be 
explained by the fact that it is an issue that affects a small number of children; recent 
estimates suggest that up to 14,000 children, only 1.5 per cent of the school population, 
are currently home educated9. However issues which affect similar numbers of children, 
for example school exclusions, teenage pregnancies and the education of ‘looked after’ 
children, have attracted a vast amount of media, government and public attention10. 
Consequently the relative silence surrounding home education can not be explained by 
numbers alone and, arguably, more accurately reflects the fact that it is currently not 
perceived as a social or educational 'problem' - either in terms of the educational and 
social developmental well being of the children home educated or in terms of broader 
public interests. 
The aim here is not to argue that home education is an, ‘undiscovered’ form of child 
harm or abuse that requires and legitimises the state to override the parental right to 
home educate. This is not to dismiss concerns about home education or to suggest that 
the right to experience school life is not one that should be taken seriously but to 
recognize that to label home education as harmful would be an oversimplification and in 
particular would in effect be to claim and to impose a universal knowledge of childhood 
and of what is 'in the best interests of the child' and such a claim would overlook both the 
state’s interest in education and the complexities of the concepts of child harm and 
abuse11. Rather the aim here is to critically examine by reference to legal, historical, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2001) 
5 T. Jeffs, ‘Children’s Rights in a new ERA?’, in B.Franklin (ed) The Handbook of Children’s Rights 
(Routledge, 1996)’; D.Monk, ‘Children’s rights in education – making sense of contradictions’, (2002) 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 14(1): 45-56. 
6 An exeption to this is Andrew Bainham who argues that ‘to deprive a child of the experience of 
school life would, in itself, be a denial of children’s rights and a failure to discharge parental 
responsibility’: Children: the modern law (Family Law, 1999, 2nd Edn) at p 542. 
7 Paul Meredith, ‘The Fall and Rise of Local Education Authorities’ XX(I) (1998) Liverpool Law 
Review 41. 
8 N.Rose Governing the Soul (Routledge, 1989);  A.Prout, ‘Children’s Participation: Control and Self-
Realisation in British Late Modernity’ (2000) 14 (4) Children and Society 304;  C.Jenks, Childhood 
(Routledge, 1996). 
9 Richard Garner, ‘Rising number of parents decide they can do a better job than the education system’, 
The Independent 28 January 2002. These figures are provided by Home Education UK – a leading 
charity in this area. In 1995 LEA records suggested that the figure was 8000 (0.09 percent) – double the 
number in 1988; however as Petrie argues these figures only record those children that the LEA is 
aware of.  
10 The number of permanent exclusions in 1997 was estimated to be around 14 000: Truancy and 
School Exclusion Report, Social Exclusion Unit, 1998. The number of teenagers becoming pregnant in 
1997 was 90,000 the number of under 16s becoming pregnant (ie those of school age and below the age 
of consent) was  7,700 and of these only 3,700 resulted in births: Teenage Pregnancy, Social Exclusion 
Unit, 1999, at p12. The absence of any national figures moreover serves to reinforce this view; for 
surveillance and the accumulation of knowledge of a subject does not construct a problem but, rather, 
as techniques of government reflect already problematised issues.  
11 D.Archard, ‘Can child abuse be defined?’, in M.King (ed) Moral Agenda’s for Children’s Welfare 
(Routledge, 1999). 
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comparative and psychoanalytical material the contingent basis of both the parental right 
to home educate and the popular and widely held claims regarding the ‘socialization’ 
benefits of schooling. The aim is not to arbitrate between these two conflicting claims but 
to explore how the ‘legal’ discourse of the former coexists with the ‘common sense’ 
discourse of the latter; how both discourses function as alternative methods of 
governance; and how the rights claims of both parents and children can be used to mask 
public interests. It concludes by assessing possible future developments. 
    
A RIGHT TO HOME EDUCATE? 
 
The existence of a parental ‘right’ to home educate, the statutory basis of which is 
explained in detail below, is firmly established in domestic law. Commentaries that 
address this issue offer uncritical support;12 but more frequently the validity of the 
parental ‘right’ is simply not debated.  Instead, the case law and the legal commentaries 
that address the issue of home education at all, focus solely on the content and form of 
the educational provision which home educators should provide and on the powers of 
local education authorities to monitor the provision.13  Important issues are at stake here; 
for example, the extent to which, if at all, home educators should be required to comply 
with the National Curriculum and whether or not local education authorities have the 
power to enter the home to inspect facilities. With regard to the National Curriculum, 
Neville Harris and Andrew Bainham have argued that its introduction has made the 
likelihood of parents being permitted to home educate ‘unlikely’14 or ‘well-nigh 
impossible’15. Yet while some LEAs may use the National Curriculum as a basis for 
assessing the suitability of the education provided by parents there is no statutory basis 
for this and indeed some parents opt for home education specifically to avoid the 
National Curriculum. The significant point here is that while emphasising or extending 
the conditions attached to the ‘right’ to home educate might serve to restrict the number 
of parents who are able to exercise their ‘right’, the legitimacy of the basic right remains 
unquestioned16. However, a closer examination of the legal provisions, their historical 
foundations and of human rights and comparative perspectives suggest that this ‘right’ is 
more complex and significantly less fundamental than it might appear.  
 
Historical Perspectives and the Current Law  
The current statutory basis for the ‘right’ to home educate is Section 7 of the Education 
Act 1996. This provision requires that: 
The parent of every child of compulsory school age shall cause him to receive 
efficient full-time education suitable – 
(a) to his age, ability and aptitude, and 
(b) to any special educational needs he may have, 
                                                           
12 A.Petrie, ‘Home education and the law’ (1998) Education and the Law Vol 10 (2-3): 123-134, at p 
134; A.Petrie, ‘Home Educators and the Law within Europe’ (1995) International Review of Education 
Vol 41 (3-4) 285-296; Paula Rothermel and Alison Fiddy, ‘The law on home-education’ (2001/2) 
ChildRight Vol 181: 19-20, at p 19; A.Thomas, Educating Children at Home (Casssell, 1998). 
13 Bevan v Shears [1911] 2 KB 936; 80 LJKB 1325; Harrison v Stevenson (1981) Unreported no 
729/81; Baker v Earl [1960] Crim LR 363; H v United Kingdom (1984) Application No 10233/83 DR 
105. 
14 Andrew Bainham, Children: the modern law (Family Law, 1999, 2nd Edn) at p 542. 
15 Neville Harris, Law and Education: Regulation, Consumersim and the Educational System (Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1993), at p 209. 
16 See however Bainham op cit n 6 at p 542. 
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either by regular attendance at school or otherwise. 
It is the final two words, ‘or otherwise’, that establish the lawfulness of home education 
as they create a crucial distinction between education and school attendance and 
establish that only the former is compulsory. There is therefore no explicit statutory 
reference to a parental right to home educate. Strictly speaking the provision in the first 
place imposes an absolute duty on parents to provide suitable education for their child 
and then provides them with a right to choose how to comply with this duty. Moreover, 
subsequent provisions make clear that it is for the local education authorities and not the 
parents to determine what is or is not a ‘suitable’ education.17 The expression ‘or 
otherwise’, which is not defined by statute, is understood to refer not simply to home 
education but to a variety of non-school environments, such as hospitals and pupil 
referral units and to home tuition provided by local education authority employees. 
Collectively these alternatives to school based education are commonly referred to as 
‘education otherwise’. The expression ‘or otherwise’ was first used in the Education Act 
1944. However its origins can be traced to the Elementary Education Act 1870, which 
required parents of children aged between 5 and 13 to ‘cause such children to attend 
school’ but provided that a ‘reasonable excuse’ would be where ‘the child is under 
efficient instruction in some other manner’18. That the expression ‘in some other manner’ 
referred to situations where parents chose to educate their children at home, is clearly 
established by the case law.19  
However in R v West Riding of Yorkshire Justice, ex p Broadbent [1910]20 a 
school board - the precursor to local education authorities - attempted to challenge the 
lawfulness of home education. This is the only recorded case in which the right to home 
educate is challenged. The fact that a school board in 1910 was willing to challenge a 
parent’s right to home educate is significant as it serves to remind us that this right is not 
unquestionable. This is all the more notable because it is clear from the facts of the case 
that it was home education per se and not the content and form of education that was at 
stake here, as it was acknowledged by all parties that the children in question were 
receiving instruction which was more effective and advanced than that which they would 
receive in the local school. The case concerned the prosecution of a father under the 
Elementary Education Act 1876 for failing to send his two daughters to the local school. 
Under the 1876 Act the only statutory defences were sickness, unavoidable cause and 
that the school was not within 2 miles of the home21 - unlike the earlier 1870 Act there 
was no mention of ‘efficient instruction in some other manner’. However the 1876 Act 
did contain a general provision that stated that definitions under that Act should be 
interpreted in the same way as those in the earlier 1870 Act. The case came before Chief 
Justice Alverstone22 who rejected the argument of the local school board. In his judgment 
he commented that: 
‘The case is one of difficulty and the material sections are obscure. I am not 
certain that it is possible to give very clear reasoning for the construction which I 
put upon the section we have to consider . . . but it would be a very strong thing 
                                                           
17 Education Act 1996 s 437 (1). 
18 Elementary Education Act 1870 s 74 (1). 
19 See for example, Bevan v Shears [1911] 2 KB 936. This and other pre 1944 cases are still cited in 
discussions of the present law and consequently it is suggested that there is no substantive distinction 
between the expressions ‘in some other manner’ and ‘or otherwise’. It has not been possible to establish 
the reason for the change in terminology. 
20 R v West Riding of Yorkshire Justice, ex p Broadbent [1910] 2 KB 192. 
21 These defences have remained unchanged, see Education Act 1996 s 444. 
22 Ref to him . . not a great jurist . . Ray Cocks! 
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to wholly deprive the parent of the right to give efficient elementary instruction to 
his own child . . . and I think it would require clearer language than the section 
contains to deprive him of that right’ (at p 197).  
In reaching this conclusion Alverstone relied on two earlier cases which had held that in 
determining prosecutions of parents for school non-attendance cases it was open for the 
courts to interpret ‘reasonable excuses’ in a broad manner and that in doing so they were 
not limited by the statutory excuses. Neither of the cases related to home education. The 
first concerned a child who was working to support her family, or in the words of the 
judge: ‘discharging the honourable duty of helping her parents’23. The second concerned 
a child who was failing to attend school out of his own choice, or ‘wandering’ as the case 
describes it, and where the justices held that ‘a labouring man could not be expected to 
employ a servant to conduct his child to school’24.  
 Tracing the ‘right to home educate’ back to 1870, rather than taking 1944 as the 
starting point, is significant for a number of reasons. In 1870, unlike in 1944, home 
education was a ‘normal’ form of education for upper and middle class children, 
especially for girls and the learning of basic skills by working class children to a certain 
extent was still compatible with certain forms of child-labour. Consequently, in 1870 the 
equating of ‘education’ as synonymous with ‘school attendance’ was still evolving. 
Moreover, compulsory education itself was perceived as an unjustifiable infringement of 
a father’s right, indeed as late as 1859 JS Mill wrote that while the educating of one’s 
child , ‘is unanimously declared to be the father’s duty, scarcely anybody, in this country 
will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it’.25  The motive for state intervention in 
1870 was largely pragmatic, influenced by political and economic concerns. Richard 
Cross, the then Minister of Education, famously commented that, ‘it is time to educate 
our masters’26 and the Act ‘filled in the gaps’ left by existing educational provision to 
ensure that all working class children would be taught the skills considered necessary for 
economic competitiveness. In many respects it was quite distinct from the far more 
ambitious Education Act of 1944. Often referred to as the ‘Great’, Education Act or 
Butler’s Act, after Rab Butler the Minister responsible for its enactment, the 1944 Act is 
frequently identified as laying the foundation for the modern education system and had 
an important practical and symbolic role in the development of the post-war welfare 
state. While it is important not to exaggerate or overstate the extent to which the Act 
‘revolutionized’ public education, and critical commentators have challenged the 
rhetorical and somewhat nostalgic narratives which surround the Act,27 it did herald a 
shift in the dominant educational discourses. In particular the 1944 Act envisaged a more 
interventionist role for the state in educational provision and a commitment to free 
universal education as a democratic right. Furthermore it cohered with developments in 
child psychology which emphasized the importance of school attendance for child 
welfare – an issue explored in more detail below. The shift in political and social 
thinking about education heralded by the 1944 Act is reflected in judicial decisions about 
                                                           
23 The London School Board v Duggan (1884) XIII QBD 176, per Stephen J at 178.  
24 The School Attendance Committee of Belper Union v Bailey (1882) IX QBD 259. 
25 JS Mill On Liberty first published 1859 (Quotation reference: Dent, 1983 at p 175). JS Mill is 
perhaps one of the most famously ‘home educated’ individuals. While he argued in favour of 
compulsory education he was passionately opposed to state control. 
26 This in part was a reference to the recent to 1867 Electoral Reform Act that had extended the 
franchise. 
27 Ray Cocks, ‘Ram, Rab and the civil servants: a lawyer and the making of the ‘Great Education Act 
1944’ (2001) Legal Studies 21 (1): 15-35; Clyde Chitty Understanding Schools and Schooling 
(Routledge/Falmer, 2002); M Barber The Making of the 1944 Education Act (Cassell, 1994). 
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school attendance. After 1944, the courts, while not using the concept of children’s 
rights, consistently reject parental excuses for not ensuring their children’s attendance at 
school and in doing so explicitly reject earlier decisions decided under the 1870 Act such 
as those cited by Alverstone CJ in West Ridings.28  Similarly, in every post-1944 case 
relating to other aspects of home education, such as its content and the monitoring 
powers of LEAs, the courts have consistently decided against parents in support of the 
LEAs.29 While it is not suggested that the West Ridings case would have been decided 
differently after 1944, it is unlikely that a court would have been able to base its decision 
as firmly on the principle of parental rights with no mention of the educational or 
developmental rights of interests of the child. The fact that the right to home education 
has its roots in the late nineteenth century and received judicial support in 1910 is, 
consequently, not surprising, but it does raise the question as to whether such an 
approach is still justifiable in the context of contemporary human rights culture.  
 
Human Rights/Parent’s Rights 
There is no explicit reference to a right to home educate in human rights law but 
numerous provisions in international, European and domestic law are relied on to 
legitimise and uphold the lawfulness of home education. Article 26 (3) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 states that: 
‘Everyone has the right to education . . . Elementary education shall be 
compulsory . . . Parents shall have a prior right to choose the kind of education 
that shall be given to their child’.  
Article 2 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (now 
contained in the Human Rights Act 1998 s 1 Sch 1 Pt II art 2) states that: 
‘No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect 
the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions’  
Parental rights in education are also contained in domestic education legislation. Section 
9 of the Education Act 1996 states that: 
‘In exercising or performing all their respective powers and duties under the 
Education Acts, the Secretary of State, local education authorities and the 
funding authorities shall have regard to the general principle that pupils are to be 
educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents’.  
For supporters of home education these provisions represent unequivocal support for the 
right to home educate; for while they uphold a child’s right to education there is no 
mention of compulsory attendance at school. Consequently, an attempt to ban or restrict 
home education can be perceived as an unjustifiable form of state intervention. The 
representation of home education as an essential civil and parental right is particularly 
evident in the USA. In the famous case of Wisconsin v Yoder the US Supreme Court 
over-ruled the conviction of members of the Amish community for failing to send their 
children to school after they had graduated from the eighth grade on the basis that it 
violated their First Amendment Rights.30 More recently the home schooling movement in 
                                                           
28 See for example Jenkins v Howells [1949] 1 All ER 942; Spiers v Warington Corporation [1954] 1 
QB 61; Hinchley v Rankin [1961] 1 WLR 421. 
29 Contrast Bevan v Shears [1911] 2 KB 936 and West Ridings [1910] 2 KB 192 with later cases of 
Baker v Earl [1960] Crim LR 363; R v Surrey Quarter Sessions, ex p Tweedie (1963) 107 Sol Jo 555; 
H v United Kingdom (1984) Application No 10233/83 DR 105; R v Gwent County Council, ex p Perry 
(1985) 129 Sol Jo 737, CA. 
30 Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 (1972). 
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the US has become increasingly dominated by the Christian Right movement31 and as a 
result closely associated with wider ‘anti-government’ campaigns which perceive the 
discourse surrounding ‘children’s rights’ as a thinly veiled liberal and secular threat to 
family and parental rights and as a means for justifying increased intervention by 
individual state and particularly federal government32. While the issue has attracted far 
less attention in Europe, supporters of home education utilize the same rights discourse. 
For example in Germany, where home education is illegal, parents have sometimes 
moved to other countries in order to home educate and in doing so they perceive 
themselves as political refugees.33 From these perspectives the parental right to home 
educate is not simply a private matter of individual choice but has a broader political 
significance to the extent that, as Petrie argues, it is ‘an essential part of democracy’34. 
This perspective clearly draws on a post-WWII model of human rights as ‘liberty’ or 
‘negative’ rights where the emphasis is on protecting individuals from the state. This 
model is particularly evident in the liberal democratic critique of the rigid centralized 
control of education by totalitarian regimes; for example the censorship of books and the 
‘rewriting’ of history by Soviet regimes played an important role in the rhetoric of the 
cold war35. Similarly, enhancing parental choice and challenging the ‘politicization’ of 
education by LEAs were both were key arguments used to justify the radical changes in 
education introduced by the 1979-1997 Conservative administrations.36
More recent approaches to human rights have emphasised ‘claim’ rights that require 
states to adopt a positive role to protect and uphold the developmental rights of children. 
This emphasis has both required and legitimised expanding educational provision and 
centralized regulation by liberal democratic states.37 Constructing education as a form of 
‘welfare’ enables state involvement to be distinguished from totalitarian control. 
Consequently, in the context of home education there is a potential tension, familiar to 
family lawyers, between the ‘liberty’ rights of parents to educate their children as they 
wish and the ‘claim’ rights of children for the state to protect their right to education and 
to monitor how parents exercise their duty to provide education. These tensions were 
considered by the European Commission of Human Rights in the case Leuffen v Federal 
Republic of Germany [1992]38.  
 
Legitimising compulsory schooling and Leuffen v Federal Republic of Germany 
 
                                                           
31 See Mitchell L. Stevens, Kingdom of Children: Culture and Controversy in the Homeschooling 
Movement, (Princeton University Press, 2001); Larry and Susan Kraseman, ‘HR6 and the 
Federalization of Homeschooling’ (1991) Home Education Magazine, January-February. More 
generally see The US National Home Education Network: http://www.nhen.org. 
32 Doris Buss, ‘“How the UN Stole Childhood”’: the Christian Right and the International Rights of the 
Child’, in Bridgeman and Monk (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Child Law (Cavendish , 2000). More 
generally on the Christina Right in the US see D Herman The Antigay Agenda: Orthodox Vision and 
the Christian Right (University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
33 A Petrie ‘Home Educators and the Law within Europe’ (1995) International Review of Education 
Vol 41 (3-4) 285. 
34 Amanda Petrie, ‘Home education and the law’ (1998) Education and the Law Vol 10 (2-3): 123-134, 
at p 134. 
35 J.White, ‘Two National Curricula – Bakers and Stalins. Towards a Liberal Alternative’ (1988) British 
Journal of Educational Studies October 1988: 218-231. 
36 N Harris, Law and Education: Regulation, Consumerism and the Educational System (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1993); Clyde Chitty Understanding Schools and Schooling (Routledge/Falmer, 2002; L Bash 
and D Coulby (eds) The Education Reform Act: Competition and Control (Cassell, 1989). 
37 D Hodgson The Human Right to Education (Ashgate, 1998). 
38 Leuffen v Federal Republic of Germany, Application No: 00019844/92. 
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In the Leuffen case the Commission of the ECHR held that a policy of compulsory 
schooling was compatible with the ECHR. Consequently, it represents an explicit 
challenge to home educators claims that the right to home educate is a fundamental 
‘human right’ of parents and one that is ‘essential for democracy’. However, the case has 
received little attention, with advocates of home education regrettably, but perhaps not 
surprisingly, choosing to downplay its significance.39 The facts of the case are 
straightforward. Renate Leuffen40 wished to educate her son Danny (born in 1984) at 
home. According to the case report, she believed that God had given her the exclusive 
responsibility and authority to educate her child; that it would be a sin to send her son to 
a traditional school because of the academic and moral decline in public schools (which 
would cause her son to be taught obscenities and become a victim of violent behaviour 
and negative socialisation pressures); and, that formal schooling amounts to child abuse 
and would be a disaster for her son’s mental and physical health. She was opposed by the 
Youth Office of the City of Dusseldorf, which appointed a tutor for her son to ensure his 
attendance at school and threatened to remove the child from his mother by force if 
necessary.41 She attempted to challenge their decision in the Dusseldorf District Court 
(Amtsgericht), Regional Court (Landgericht), Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) and 
finally at the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) but was 
unsuccessful at every level. Having exhausted the domestic remedies she brought a case 
to the European Commission of Human Rights where her central allegation was a 
violation of her rights under Article 2 of Protocol No 1 (see above).  
In deeming her application inadmissible, the Commission held that the German 
authorities were justified in their actions as they had established, with the help of expert 
opinion, that the mother was not able to ensure the education of her son.42 In reaching 
this conclusion it relied on the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights which 
had held that the child’s right to education takes precedence over any parental right. In 
Campbell Cosans v UK (1982) the court held that ‘the convictions of parents must not 
conflict with the fundamental right of the child to education, the whole of Article 2 of the 
first protocol being dominated by its first sentence’43. In Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and 
Pedersen v Denmark (1976) the Court described the philosophical basis of the respect for 
parents’ rights in the following way: 
‘it is in the discharge of a natural duty towards their children – parents being 
primarily responsible for the education and teaching of their children – that 
parents may require the State to respect their religious and philosophical 
                                                           
39 The only known references to it are by Petrie – but no citation is provided and the Commission’s 
arguments are not stated: A Petrie, ‘Home education and the law’ (1998) Education and the Law Vol 
10 (2-3): 123-134, at p 126 and ‘Home Educators and the Law within Europe’ (1995) International 
Review of Education Vol 41 (3-4) 285, at 293. 
40 Renate Leuffen is in some respects a German equivalent of Victoria Gillick; a catholic, she is a 
journalist and high profile parent’s rights activist. Her publications include: Naturlich ohne Schule 
leben (Bonn, Germany: Kid Verlag, 1993); Home Education Today: A Reference Book with Basic 
Information, (unpublished manuscript, 1994). (Both cited in Amanda Petrie, op cit 1995). On losing her 
appeal Petrie informs us that in order to avoid being separated from her son, ‘with the knowledge of 
Interpol’ she and her son, ‘fled’ to the UK from Strasbourg where with the agreement of Haringey 
Education Authority she was permitted to home educate: Petrie, 1998 at p 293. 
41 The equivalent legal procedures in England would be a School Attendance Order (Education Act 
1996 ss 437, 443, 444) and an Education Supervision Order (Children Act 1989 s 36).  
42 This fact is disputed by Petrie who states that Leuffen’s ‘ability to home educate was never assessed, 
the school authorities stating that home education was not permitted’, ‘Home Educators and the Law 
within Europe’ (1995) International Review of Education Vol 41 (3-4) 285, at 293. 
43 Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 293, ECHR. 
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convictions. Their right thus corresponds to a responsibility closely linked to the 
enjoyment and exercise of the right to education’44. 
Thus far, the judgment in Leuffen adopts a line of reasoning which in effect reflects the 
position in the UK; namely that the right to home educate is an aspect of parental 
responsibility and conditional on the provision of ‘suitable’ education. 
Having established that in this case the mother was not able to ensure the 
education of her son the Commission could have stopped there.  However it went on to 
hold that Article 2 of the First Protocol, ‘does not prevent the State from establishing 
compulsory schooling’ (emphasis added). This is significant, for while the article is clear 
in establishing a right to education it makes no reference to schooling and the distinction 
between the two is crucial in the case for home education. The Commission reached this 
conclusion in the following way. First, it argued that the first sentence of Article 2 of the 
First Protocol, ‘by its very nature calls for regulation by the State’. This interpretation, 
which emphasises a positive role for the State, is problematic as the article is framed in 
negative terms; a fact that has been emphasised by the Court in cases where parents have 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to argue for particular forms of education to be provided by 
the State45. In addition, the positive duty of the State to protect a child’s right to 
education could, arguably, be adequately performed by monitoring the content and nature 
of home education. This is the approach adopted in the UK and its legality was 
confirmed in H v United Kingdom (1984).46  
The Commission’s second argument focused on the second sentence of Article 2 
of the First Protocol, that ‘In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to 
education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions’. Here it again relied on the judgment in Kjeldsen where the Court held that 
the State was justified in making sex education compulsory against the wishes of parents 
as long as the aim of such education was to provide ‘information’ and did not represent a 
form of ‘indoctrination’. Moreover the Court again emphasised the positive role of the 
State when it held that the purpose of the second sentence was to ‘safeguard the 
possibility of pluralism in education . . . which is essential for the preservation of the 
democratic society’, and that, ‘in view of the power of the modern State, it is above all 
through State teaching that this aim must be realised’. These arguments are problematic. 
Most strikingly they fail to address the fact that it is precisely because of the power of the 
modern state that home education is arguably justified. Some parents may choose to 
home educate in order to inculcate anti-democratic and extremist views in their children 
– and it is this fear that partly informs the Germany policy – but the motivations of home 
educators are enormously varied and the absolute ban, as opposed to a conditional right, 
is not proportionate. In addition, while the Commission relied extensively on the 1979 
case of Kjeldsen that upheld the lawfulness of compulsory sex education in schools, the 
Commission failed to note that in Kjeldsen the Court referred to the fact that Danish 
parents who objected to the policy had the opportunity to educate their children at home. 
It is regrettable that the Commission did not explicitly explain why the German 
authorities’ policy of compulsory schooling was justified, either in relation to the child’s 
right to education or in relation to ‘the preservation of democratic society’. This omission 
                                                           
44 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976) 1 EHRR 711, ECHR. 
45 See Belgian Linguistics  1968; Appls Nos 6853/74 and 7782/77. For a discussion of other cases see 
H Mountfield, ‘The Implications of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the law of education’, (2000) 
Education Law Journal 146-148.  
46 H v United Kingdom (1984) Application No 10233/83 DR 105. 
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gives credence to the possibility that the Commission simply ‘confused’ schooling with 
education. As Petrie demonstrates in a survey of comparative literature in this area this 
confusion is frequently made47. However there are two alternative ways in which the 
jurisdiction of the ECHR could have been applied by the Commission in order to 
legitimise the German policy of compulsory schooling.  
 
School life = ‘Private Life’ 
As mentioned above the Commission rejected the mother’s claim that her right to privacy 
under article 8 of the ECHR had been violated on the basis that it was justified by reason 
of article 8 (2); namely that the interference was ‘in accordance with the law’ and was 
‘necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’, in this case the 
protection of the right of the child to education. This approach reinforces the 
interpretation of article 2 of the first protocol whereby the parental right is deemed 
secondary to the child’s right. However it is significant that the Commission did not rely 
on the justification in article 8 (2) that interference with the right to privacy is justified if 
‘necessary in a democratic society’.  
An alternative and converse use of article 8 would be to argue that denying a 
child the right to attend school would be a violation of the child’s right to privacy. This 
speculative argument draws on the creative interpretations of ‘private life’ that have been 
accepted by the European Court of Human Rights; and in particular that it has been 
deemed to incorporate ‘a right to develop a personality in conjunction with others’48. 
This approach has the advantage of bringing to the fore the crucial distinction between 
education and schooling. Moreover, as human rights barrister Helen Mountfield has 
suggested, the use of article 8 in the education field, ‘may be an area which is apt for 
such development’49. In the context of Leuffen this approach would however be of 
limited value as that case concerned the lawfulness of the state imposing a policy of 
compulsory schooling and there are two important distinctions between this and 
attempting to establish a child’s right to school life. First the former concerns a power of 
the State and does not attempt to impose a duty; secondly, in the context of Leuffen 
claiming the right to a school life is not in effect against the State, or a public authority, 
but against the parent wishing to home educate. To resist this it would be necessary to 
emphasise both the responsibility of the State to secure the rights protected by the ECHR 
to everyone in its jurisdiction50 and that the parental decision to home educate is a 
statutory duty and a ‘public function’.51  
 
Schooling = Education 
The second argument in support of compulsory schooling introduces the value or issue of 
socialisation. If the socialisation benefits of school attendance, such as social skills and 
interpersonal development, are understood to form part of the right to education under 
Article 2 of the First Protocol then it can be argued that no parent is capable of ensuring 
the education of his or her child at home and that in effect school attendance is essential 
                                                           
47 Amanda Petrie, ‘Home Educators and the Law within Europe’ (1995) International Review of 
Education Vol 41 (3-4) 285-296. 
48 Niemetz v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 97, at para 29. 
49 H Mountfield, ‘The Implications of the Human Rights Act 1998 for the law of education’, (2000) 
Education Law Journal 146-148, at p 149. 
50 Such an approach was used in the case of Costello-Roberts v UK [1994] ELR 1 against an 
independent school’s policy of corporal punishment. 
51 See H Mountfield op cit for a more detailed discussion of the meaning of ‘public authorities’ in the 
context of education cases. 
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for ‘education’. This approach relies on two assumptions. First, that social and 
developmental benefits form part of the right to education and secondly that only school 
attendance can provide this broad form of education. 
Authority for a broad definition of education can be found in a number of sources. 
Most importantly the second sentence of Article 2 of the First Protocol refers to both 
‘education’ and ‘teaching’ and in the case of Campbell and Cosins the two words were 
given distinct meanings. The Court argued that ‘education’ included, ‘the development 
and moulding of the character and mental powers of its pupils’ and referred to, ‘the 
whole process whereby, in any society, adults endeavour to transmit their beliefs, culture 
and other values to the young, whereas ‘teaching’ or instruction refers in particular to the 
transmission of knowledge and to intellectual development’52.  
Support for a broad definition of education can be found in the UN Convention 
on Children’s Rights 1989 and in UK domestic law. Article 29 of the UN Convention on 
Children’s Rights 1989 states that, ‘the education of the child shall be directed to the 
development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their 
fullest potential’. In domestic law there is no clear definition of education but the 
Secretary of State, local education authorities, governing bodies and head teachers are 
required to ensure that the curriculum is:  
‘balanced and broadly based; promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and 
physical development of pupils at school and of society; and prepares pupils for 
the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life53.  
This duty however does not apply to parents and in the case law regarding definitions of 
‘suitable’ education there is no reference to social or developmental aspects rather a 
narrow traditional skills based approach is adopted54. Indeed the House of Lords recently 
held that a regime that kept a pupil in complete physical isolation from all staff and other 
pupils of the school was acceptable.55 This is in contrast to the approach adopted by the 
German domestic courts when rejecting Leuffen’s appeals where the benefits of school 
attendance per se were emphasized. The Dusseldorf Court of Appeal argued that 
Leuffen’s ‘refusal to send her son to school was an abuse of her right to care for her son 
and gravely endangered his mental and emotional health and development’, and that, 
‘Compared to the education provided by a single person, conventional schools had the 
advantage of contributing to the child’s ability to interact successfully on a social level’. 
Similarly the Federal Constitutional Court stressed ‘the importance for children to have 
school certificates and learn social behaviour’ (emphasis added).  
While there is strong support for a definition of education that incorporates 
‘socialisation’, the second assumption, that it is only school attendance and not home 
education that can best provide for this broad form of education, is far more problematic. 
Assumptions about socialisation are crucial to establishing that school life is part of the 
right to education but in order to explore them it is necessary to look beyond law. 
 
                                                           
52 Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982) 
53 Education Act 1996 s 351 (1)(a), (b). 
54 See for example, R v Carmarthenshire County Council, ex p White [2001] ELR 172; R v Vale of 
Glamorgan County Council, ex p J [2001] ELR 223, QBD. Beyond these cases psychological care and 
social development is emphasized now in the context of PSHE and citizenship – but linked to skills – 
not an end in itself: D Monk (2002) Children’s Rights in Education - making sense of contradictions, 
Child and Family Law Quarterly Vol 14 (1): 45-56. Beyond law this broad definition of education 
finds support in philosophical justifications for education: C Wringe (Quoted in Fortin p 131) 
55 Re L (a minor by his father and litigation friend) [2003] UKHL 9. 
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‘SOCIALISATION’ 
Concerns about the psychological and social developmental effects or implications of 
home education are widely held. An example of these concerns are the statements made 
by the German authorities in the Leuffen case quoted above.  QUOTE ALSO FROM 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLE CONCERN by UK expert!!!]. However these concerns are not 
limited to ‘expert’ or officials, for anecdotal evidence suggests that these concerns are 
frequently the initial response to the issue. They can also be detected in a variety of 
popular narratives about home-educated children. One example is the media reporting of 
‘gifted’ children such as Ruth Lawrence who like her are always home educated. In these 
accounts the ‘praise’ for their precocious examination successes are quickly followed by 
a thinly veiled expression of concern, twinned with a degree of schadenfreude, about 
their lack of friends and inabilities to interact with their peers56. Similarly the obituaries 
of Princess Margaret frequently implied that her isolated home education was in part the 
cause of her unhappiness in later life57. While being exceptionally ‘gifted’ and ‘royal’ are 
arguably the prime causes of these individuals distinctive ‘otherness’, what is significant 
in this context is the extent to which in these popular narratives home education is clearly 
identified as having exacerbated the ‘harm’ deriving from their ‘difference’ by failing to 
temper it. The clear message underlying these stories is that attending school is the 
‘normal thing to do’. Despite the fact that mass school attendence in Western countries is 
a relatively recent phenomenon, and globally still far from universal, school attendance is 
perceived as an almost essential component of the experience of childhood. It is this 
premise that underlies assertions of the existence of a ‘right to school life’, for as the 
critical theorist Erica Burman argues, ‘childhood becomes an entity, the deprivation of 
which constitutes a violation of human rights’58. Within this cultural paradigm home 
education does not simply describe an alternative form of education but a practice that 
robs a child of childhood. The largely unquestioned  assumptions about the benefits of 
schooling attest to the ‘self-confidence and tenacity of contemporary western notions of 
childhood’59. Moreover, commencing school represents a rite of passage of emotional, as 
much as educational significance and one that informs individual subjectivities; as Susie 
Orbach writes, ‘For many of us, long out of school, the rhythm of the year still starts in 
September’60. Similarly, school reunion web sites and school uniform parties reflect what 
Jenks describes as the adult nostalgia in late modernity for childhood,61 but they also 
reinforce the importance of school as a key spatial and temporal marker of childhood and 
                                                           
56 See for example Danny Leigh comparing his own experiences with that of Lawrence: ‘Adolescence 
in all its sordid, humiliating glory was calling; but not for Ruth, busy disappearing in a quicksand of 
perpetual scholarship and arrested development’, ‘Ruth and me’, The Guardian, May 10, 2000. See 
also E Addley, ‘Are the kids all right?’, The Guardian, August 24, 2001 and S Hattenstone and E 
Brockes, ‘I’m not Crbaby Soo-Fi any more’, The Guardian, July 7, 2000. In the Ruth Lawrence the 
case the father took responsibility for her education – unusual as generally the mother . . .another 
form of transgression.  . . point to look at later . . quote from him . . . depriving her of  
achildhood!. 
57 Conversely sending of members of the royal family to schools was perceived as move towards 
normality. . . Ben Pimlott 
58 E Burman, ‘Innocents abroad: Western fantasies of childhood and the iconography of emergencies’ 
(1994) 18 Disasters 238, p 242. 
59 H.Hendrick, ‘Constructions and Reconstructions of British Childhood: An Interpretative Survey, 
1800 to the Present’, in A James and A Prout (eds) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood 
(London: Routledge Falmer, 2nd edn, 1997), at p 34.  
60 Susie Orbach, ‘Starting School’, in What’s really going on here? Making sense of our emotional 
lives (Virago, 1994). 
61 C Jenks Childhood (Routledge, 1996). 
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the concerns about home education similarly attest to limits to legitimate childhood 
spaces for socialization.  For while ‘socialisation’ is seen to be an important aspect of 
child development when it takes place at a time or place that is perceived as 
inappropriate then it is a problem to be dealt with. Curfew orders and truancy patrols are 
most recent attempts. Consequently upholding the school as a legitimate childhood space 
for socialization reflects a prevailing cultural resistance to constructing children as 
anything other than family members or school pupils.  
In theoretical terms these concerns about the socialization of home-educated 
children (which are quite distinct from academic skills) represent a ‘common sense’ 
knowledge claim, an ‘a priori’ claim to truth. This is to say that it represents a dominant 
and largely unquestioned knowledge which functions as a powerful discourse that defines 
‘normality’ (in this case that school attendance is normal and that school makes you 
normal). The self-evident/unquestionable status of this common sense is reinforced by 
silences. The relative silence about the increase in home education, the erroneous but 
frequent equating of education with schooling62 whereby the right to education becomes 
synonymous with a right to attend school and in doing so renders home education 
invisible. Most strikingly, while the rhetoric of enhancing parental choice, participation 
and partnership in education has been emphasized and celebrated by Conservative and 
New Labour governments – the option of home education has been notably absent from 
official discourses.  
 
Opposite of silence!!!!! . . see them!!! 
 
A final indicator or evidence of the power of the common sense knowledge and 
assumptions about the benefits of school can be detected from listening to home 
educators themselves. They often speak of themselves in transgressive terms as, ‘free 
range educators’63 and ‘trailblazers’64 and a number of their key texts in the UK are 
published by the ‘Educational Heretics Press65’. The use of language here is significant 
as it represents a defiant acknowledgment of the fact that they are challenging deeply 
embedded norms. They also use the language of political dissidents and refugees; this 
enables them to draw on the discourse of rights but also indicates a perception of 
themselves as a discriminated – almost persecuted - minority.66 The construction of this 
minority group status is reinforced by the existence and development of an increasingly 
well organized national and international community which campaigns, networks and 
provides support for home educators.67 Moreover within this ‘community’ the parents 
often speak of themselves as becoming home educators not simply as parents who home 
educate.68 It becomes an identity and not simply an activity and the implications of 
becoming a home educator frequently go beyond the education of their children. For 
example in many of the narratives of the parents the decision to home educate is spoken 
                                                           
62 M. Freeman, ‘Children’s Education: A Test Case for Best Interests and Autonomy’, in Davie and 
Galloway (eds) Listening to Children in Education (David Fulton Publishers, 1996). 
63 Free rangers . . .  
64 Roland Meighan, The Next Learning System: and why hone educators are trailblazers (Educational 
Heretics Press, 1997) 
65 Roland Meighan, The Next Learning System: and why hone educators are trailblazers (Educational 
Heretics Press, 1997); Jan Fortune-Wood, Doing it their way: home based education and autonomous 
learning (Educational Heretics Press, 2000). 
66 Petrie! 
67 Examples of web sites . . .publications organsisations . . European and US! 
68 Book review chapter 4 . . becoming 
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of in emancipatory life changing terms. However home educators are enormously diverse 
and it is important not to characterize them as a monolithic group. Amongst them are 
Christian right traditionalists and new age hippies who are unlikely to have anything else 
in common. Yet it is this very diversity that makes the construction of an identity and the 
development of a community more striking and can be understood to represent what 
Foucault has described as a ‘reverse discourse’ (Foucault) which is both a response and a 
result of the marginalization of home educators from the mainstream and reflects the 
extent which their choice to home educate challenges dominant norms.  
Foucault’s concept of a ‘reverse discourse’ is often associated with queer theory and 
lesbian and gay studies has been utilized most often in the context of queer and and this 
analogy has further significance in the context of home educators in particular in 
exploring the different responses to the issue of socialization amongst home educators 
themselves. Home educators not surprisingly refute the allegations about the potential 
harm caused by home education. In a review of research into the issue Medlin, while 
acknowledging the weaknesses in the methodology of the research, argues that home 
educated children participate in more activities of their wider communities than schooled 
children and grew up to be functional and happy in their chosen lives69 . . see also Petrie 
. . overwhelming!!!!. Underlying the home educators claims are two distinct approaches. 
First in arguing that home education does not harm their children they emphasis that their 
children develop and function ‘normally’ (in this respect they emphasis friendships, 
interaction with peers and academic and work achievements. Alongside this approach are 
more radical claims that in effect their children are ‘better socialized’; in this respect they 
emphasise that their children, compared to children who attend school, mix with a wider 
range of people and crucially are not restricted by age to in their social interaction. There 
are similarities here with the strategies adopted by lesbian mothers70; where there is a 
similar tension as the stategic need to emphasise their normality can result in a reluctance 
to publically celebrate the radical transformative potential. While lesbian mothers claim 
that their parenting can challenge the gendered assumptions of the traditional family ; 
home educators argue that they challenge the ageism of dominant educational practices. 
A further similarity is the approach towards privacy . . both claim righst to privacy and 
the right to bring up children as they wish; a sort of leave us alone . . at the same time 
some home educators wish to challenge the silence about the issue and argue that more 
parents should be informed about the fact that they have the choice and freedom to home 
educate. (see here repated references in h-e literature to: ‘it is your right’; don’t believe 
people who tell you you can not do it, or that it is too difficult’). The tension here is 
between a desire for visibility and privacy – significantly this highlights the limits to the 
private/public understanding of the issue. 
This ‘common sense’ functions as a mode of governance which is quite 
distinct from the traditional juridical control. For while in Germany where home 
education is forbidden by law parents wishing or attempting to home educate are 
criminalized in this country parents who choose to home educate are perceived at 
best as somewhat eccentric or odd and at worst with a degree of suspicion and 
unease - to a certain extent both achieve similar ends – the norm of school 
attendance but in distinct ways.   
 
                                                           
69 R G Medlin, ‘Home Schooling and the Question of Socialization’, 2000 Peabody Journal of 
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Looking Beyond Common Sense 
Despite the common sense perception that attending school is necessary for child 
development there appears to be remarkably little evidence or research to support this 
claim, rather school attendance simply appears to be ‘the normal thing to do’. However 
in attempting to identify a basis for the perception that home education may be harmful 
and more particularly in attempting to trace a genealogy of the ‘common sense’ view 
important clues can be found in the work of the psychoanalysts John Bowlby and Donald 
Winnicott.  
 
The work of Bowlby and Winnicott has had a tremendous influence on modern 
understandings of child development and on parental identities and practices. In 
particular Bowlby’s thesis of ‘maternal deprivation’ and Winnicotts pro-natalist approach 
emphasised the importance of the mother-child bond and the dangers of early separation. 
In the context of family law their influence is reflected in the assumption in residence 
disputes that young children need to be with their mothers71. Feminist and social 
constructivist critics of Bowlby and Winnicott have demonstrated that while this 
represented a shift from paternal rights to a child centred approach it simultaneously 
reinforced an essentialist construction of mothers as ‘innately’ nurturing and how in the 
post WWII era their work reinforced a 
‘powerful ideology of the centrality of motherhood that supported the intentions 
of the government of the day to reconstruct “the family” as the cornerstone of a 
stable and prosperous society72’.  
However in the post war era alongside the family, state education was also perceived to 
be a key ‘cornerstone of a stable and prosperous society’ – and this is particularly evident 
in the ideology underlying and almost iconic status of the Great Education Act 194473. 
While Bowlby and Winnicott are perhaps best known for their identification of the 
importance of the mother-child bond in this context what is significant is that they also, 
albeit in different ways, emphasise the importance of breaking this bond in ways that 
arguably can be read to implicitly support compulsory school attendance. In short while 
parent and in particular mother-child ‘separation’ is problematised to support the new 
family, ‘attachment’ is problematised to support the new education system.  
In Bowlby this understanding is most apparent in his writings on ‘school phobia’ or 
school refusal74. Before addressing school phobia Bowlby takes pains to distinguish it 
from truancy; and in doing so demonstrates the potential problems of both anxious 
attachment and traumatic separation. In instances of truancy, he argues that children do 
not express anxiety about attending school and that truants ‘often steal or are otherwise 
delinquent’ and ‘commonly come from unstable or broken homes and have experienced 
long/and or frequent separations or changes of mother figure’ (300). So in connection 
with truancy we have the classic Bowlby approach blaming it on mothers and separation. 
 However in cases of school phobia he states that ‘Relations between child and parents 
are close, sometimes to the point of suffocation’ (emphasis added) p 300). What is 
immediately clear here is his linking of school phobia not with the school but once again 
with parenting. This point is made far more explicitly later when he states authoritatively 
                                                           
71 Jonathan Herring, ‘The Welfare Principle and the Rights of Parents’ 
72 Day Sclater, Bainham, Richards, ‘Introduction’ in Day Sclater, Bainham, Richards (eds) What is a 
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that: 
‘At an empirical level there is substantial agreement among . . . many authors, 
both in regard to the personalities, behaviour, and symptoms presented by the 
children and in regard to the personalities, behaviour, and symptoms presented by 
the parents. Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that what a child fears is 
not what will happen at school, but leaving home . . . almost all the students of 
the problem conclude that the disagreeable features of school, for example a strict 
teacher or teasing or bullying from other children, are little more than 
rationalizations (301). 
Bowlby then proceeds to contrast this with what he describes as genuine phobias and 
argues that school phobia is consequently ‘an obvious misnomer’ and instead identifies 
its causes within four different models of ‘anxious attachment’. Within all these models 
the mother is key – although Bowlby does acknowledge that it in rare circumstances it 
may be the father that is to blame. In the first model, which Bowlby argues is the 
commonest and may be combined with the others, the mother is a sufferer from chronic 
anxiety regarding attachment figures and retains the child at home to be a companion; in 
the other models the child fears that something dreadful will happen to the mother while 
he is at school and so remains at home to prevent it happening or the mother fears that 
something will happen to the child while he is at school and so keeps him at home or the 
child fears that something dreadful will happen to himself if he is away from home and 
so remains at home to prevent that happening.  
Bowlby’s approach to school phobia is significant in relation to home education in 
general.  For while school phobia or refusal is only of the many reasons why parents 
choose to home educate the motives of any parent or mother that attempts or expresses a 
desire to home educate are immediately suspected of being an indication of a 
pathological condition of the mother and not a rational assessment of her child’s best 
needs. In this way his work his arguably a basis of the collective common sense 
suspicion an unease that home educators provoke. More generally Bowlby’s refusal to 
see the school as in any way responsible reinforces the perception of schooling as 
inherently normal and unproblematic. In this respect there are similarities again with the 
feminist  scholarship in family law nuclear family –as attempts to raise awareness of the 
potential harms and dangers to children within both the nuclear family and within schools 
causes unease and has been strongly resisted as they pose a threat to the social and 
political investment and construction of them as child friendly and child appropriate 
spaces75. Indeed in relation to the school it is only in the last couple of years that bullying 
has been identified as a problem that needs to be addressed and that school refusal has 
been acknowledged to be a rational reaction to school. 
 
In Winnicott’s work the home and the school represent distinct but mutually supportive 
sites or spaces for child development. This is most evident in his explanation of early 
years through the binary concepts of Excursions and Returns and of Loyalty and 
Disloyalty. Underlying both concepts is an understanding of the home and in particular 
of the mother-child bond as a uniform natural state from which the child gradually moves 
away from towards the father and the external objective world in order to develop as an 
independent individual. Within this framework Excursions away from the mother enable 
the child to discover the objective world but for healthy development in the early years a 
child needs to Return from them and merge again with the subjective environment 
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represented by the relationship with the mother. Similarly in relation to Loyalty and 
Disloyalty, which Winnicott argues is a necessary conflict inherent in child development, 
the relationship within the family and especially with the mother should ideally provide 
the immature child with ‘a situation in which loyalty is not expected’ (137). School life, 
in contrast to the family, requires group discipline and while Winnicott argues that 
children have different needs and that there is no right age at which children should go to 
school he implies that the Excursion to school and the Loyalty that it requires are 
necessary for healthy development. Indeed he argues that ‘the school can provide 
tremendous relief for the child living in the family’ (139). The reference here to ‘the 
school’ is significant to the extent that it echoes his references to ‘the mother’ and ‘the 
family’ and in this way reinforces the construction of the school as an institution that 
requires no definition that it exists prior to discourse. Moreover he echoes Bowlby’s 
idealized view of the home and simultaneous concerns about anxious attachment in his 
approach to the early pre school years as he argues that,  
‘When in doubt the child’s home is the place where the richest experiences can 
be reached, but one has to be always on the look out for the child who, for one 
reason or another, cannot be creative in imaginative play until he or she spends a 
few hours each day outside the family’. (139) 
In relation to both Bowlby and Winnicott it is important to make clear that while they 
pathologies parents who challenge the school and support school attendance neither of 
them explicitly address the issue of home education nor can their work be understood as 
simply justifying government policies. Indeed to the extent that Winnicott challenges a 
set age for compulsory education and argued that in relation to the early years ‘in any one 
neighbourhood all kinds of provisions should be available’ (139) his approach conflicts 
with both the contemporary and current legal and educational policy. Moreover the ‘child 
centred’ perspective which they both championed, while problematic to the extent that it 
bonded the child, ‘only to “good” or “bad” parents, not to being a member of a wider 
community or kin network’76, arguably played an important part in the recognition of 
the potential conflict between parents’ rights and child welfare and the development of 
the children’s rights movement. Indeed it is their child centred focus that informs their 
implicit concerns about home education.  
It is however important not to reduce their work to a binary school education =good; 
home education = bad division. Both are more complex and in particular have been 
criticized and corrected by institutional reflexivity of their disciplines. 
Consequently while their work can be used as a scientific basis for the knowledge claim 
about home education and socialisation its continued existence as a dominant discourse 
and its reduction to a simple binary truth claim is more complex. 
Arguably it is maintained by through an uneasy alliance between professional interests of 
educational psychologists and teachers; a public demand for authoritative scientific 
answer in the face of the uncertainties of late modernity – where as Jenks highlights 
childhood is a site for particularly need for certainty. (At its extreme Wendy Brown 
describes this persistence faith in science as reactionary foundationalism’) and, finally, 
broader political and economic interests in education. 
In relation to this last ‘interest’ the failure of Bolwby and Winnicott to relate the child to 
the broader community is important as it implictly silences mention of class and reduces 
education to a welfarist provision – excluding other educational discourses that have 
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arguably been more significant and influential in the provision of public education AND 
by doing so reinforces the notion of schooling as  an essential good for all children. . .  
[At the same time in exploring the connection between their work and educational 
policies and common sense perceptions it is important to locate both in a broader 
political and historical context].For while their understanding of healthy functional child 
development lends credence to and coheres with a policy of encouraging school 
attendance the reverse isn’t true ie it is does not mean that concerns about child 
development are or were the primary or sole motive underlying the provision of 
education by the state and the enforcement of school attendance.  In this context it is 
informative to remember that at the time of the Elementary Education Act 1870 not only 
did psychoanalytic accounts of child development not exist but for the upper and upper 
middles classes home education for girls and boarding schools were the norm – both 
forms of education that conflict with current notions of healthy child development as 
informed by Bowlbys attachment/separtion thesis. The motive for state intervention in 
1870 was largely political and economic – as Richard Cross the then Minister for the 
Board of Education remarked at the time ‘It is time to educate our masters’. Moreover 
where concern about mental development can be identified it was in terms imbuing a 
prescriptive traditional morality. Consequently in explaining the prescribing in 1870 of 
the age of 5 as the age for compulsory education – which remains unchanged today – it is 
not Bowlby or Winnicotts ideas about the mother child bond that were relevant. After 
1944 it is possible to see the social or internal welfare of the child becoming a more 
significant factor in education policy. The fact that while prior to this date all cases 
relating to home education were decided in favour of the parents and that after 1944 the 
courts have consistently supported LEAs supports the view that a more child centred 
perspective entered the legal and political discourses at this time. However it is possible 
to view the increased intervention and regulation of education by the state – supported by 
courts - not so much as a post-war recognition of the social developmental role of 
education but as being informed by similar motives as the legislators of 1870; in other 
words the primary motives underlying, for example, the introduction, of the National 
Curriculum, citizenship lessons and to a certain extent even PSHE has arguably more to 
do with political and economic concerns than with psychoanalysis.  
A further and particularly significant indication of the marginality of social or 
developmental concerns in educational policy is the reluctance of the state to intervene in 
private or independent education. The norm of home education and boarding schools in 
1870 provides clear evidence of this a does the concern of the judges in Bevan in 1910 
that central prescription of the curriculum for home educators may impact on public 
schools. Moreover while the 1944 Act was heralded as providing education for a new 
society – research into the drafting of Act reveals how public schools were again 
protected from intervention by the state77.  
Acknowledging the public interest in education is not fatal to the case for compulsory 
schooling – socialisation is clearly not the only purpose of education. But there is a risk 
that the socialisation argument – as a neutral best interests argument – could be used to 
mask traditional or collectivist and community based public interest concerns, as these 
concerns might not cohere with all parents or children’s aspirations and expectations of 
education. I’m not suggesting that the public interest based concerns about home 
education are wrong or illegitimate – but they are inherently political and so distinct from 
the socialization argument.  
Consequently while if the psychoanalysts are right schooling might be in the best 
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interests of the child – middle class right. 
large extended families!!!!!!! . . also 1944 while progressive – not for the middle classes 
– their right to educate as they wish up held (Cocks!) 
 
****IS learning social behaviour necessary for democracy!!! . . . is nforcing collectivity 
over individualism . . ?? 
 
CHALLENGES BY HOME EDUCATORS 
Eg 
Defence –home can provide for this too 
Mixing with all generation 
Not all learning 
Plus  - home ed can do this better! 
Harm of school – mentally!challneg to age related standards – Piaget 
Different question . . rather than is home education harmful . . where does the assumption 
about the necessity, the good about schooling come from 
Explore the conditions of possibility of the assumptions 
CONCLUSION 
 
Both sidea claim the rights of the child . . Leuffen . . childs right to education . . not 
parents . . H-Es . . also uphold interests of child . . both overlook the broader interests . . 
The left challenges home education in US . . it is anti christian right and pro state, pro 
collectivism, enforced plurality . . IN Germany radicals sometimes anti sate control here 
(penalized hippy commune kids) . . the issue plays out differently in different contexts. 
AIM here is to challenge socialization and expert arguments used v home educators not  
to support them  . . but rather to demand a more political argument that reaches faith and 
public schools too. 
Demonstrate the problems of relying on socialization arguments . . . because it reconciles 
individual liberty with social control 
 
Open up new questions and possibilities . . not to support rt wing home educators 
(Christina Right in US very keen) . . but to expose the public interest in school  - to 
improve schools, make them more child responsive . . and other possibilities of education 
beyond the school – Hans Magnus Enzensburger . . reconfigure underdtzndings of parent. 
 
Thinking critically about the family and the school 
 
Clear righto compulsory schooling but case for school as childs right neds to be clearer . . 
the loss not substantiated . . difference in education? 
Why hom education tackles key issues in contemporary education policy – 
standards/difference . . purpose of education . . . faith schools/private schools . . return to 
silence! 
Talmud case = future oreinetated . . .  
 
 . . how to open educational discourse to child development – not to ban home ducatebut 
to incorporate mental helath into defn of suitable both in the home and in the school . . 
work on children’s experiences 
 
Future deveopments . . .type of society . . beyond education . . beyond child welfare. 
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Governance 
Schooling AND education . . Enzsensburger . . beyond school 
- should govt wish to ban it - one option - unlikely - but still an option!! - what is more 
likely central control of what is required . . . . . In E and W at present no question of 
comp schooling – indeed draft guidance from DFE states that . . . .. However the issue of 
defining education  - what is suitable is till of importance – because the right, while 
unquestioned is conditional on . . ] 
CONCLUSION NOTES . . .see Foucault quote in SLS article . . not a logical progression 
of history!!! 
 
Petrie . . h-e in UK = commitment to democratic principles . . .more complex than that . . 
motives for education varied . . compul schooling compatible with democracy . . . a 
bulwark for it . . citizenship etc  . . tension between teaching democracy . . . and 
practising it!! 
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